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Abstract 
 
We examine whether analyst recommendations for the German stock market contain new 
information which, on average, trigger market price adjustments. Our results show that the stock 
prices react immediately and significantly to changes in the consensus of recommendations. 
This reaction has a longer lasting effect for downgrades (until event day t+5) than for upgrades 
(until event day t+2). Moreover, the magnitude of the reaction is -1.54% based on the market-
adjusted method and -1.43% for the mean-adjusted method. In terms of percentage reaction, it is 
larger for downgrades than for upgrades which lead to abnormal returns of only 0.74% and 
0.76%, respectively. 
Besides the examination of the market reaction the results display that different factors 
determine the observed abnormal return. The findings show that upgrades to strong buy result in 
a higher stock price reaction than upgrades to another consensus recommendation level. Fur-
thermore, upgrades with a high consensus recommendation revision have a higher stock price 
impact than a lower revision. On the other hand, downgrades with a higher delta of the target 
price revision have a larger negative impact on stock prices than target price revisions with a 
smaller delta. 
 
  
 Johannes Ruhm, Marco J. Menichetti, Pascal Gantenbein 31 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Stock market analysts are an integral part of capital markets and therefore attract a lot of 
attention, particularly since they’re supposed to reduce asymmetric information. Their reports 
but more especially their recommendations are closely observed by both institutional and indi-
vidual investors as well as by researchers.  It is often hypothesized that analysts can forecast and 
influence stock price movements by means of their reports and recommendations [1]. For quite 
a long time, academics have been interested whether analyst recommendations contain useful 
information that result in market price adjustments. A significant body of research papers 
records that stock prices react significantly positively to upgrades and significantly negatively to 
downgrades in the consensus of recommendations [2, 3, 4]. Our research addresses the market 
price reaction i.e. the stock price movement due to changes in recommendation consensus of 
analysts and gives evidence on the question whether recommendation revisions do contain new 
information. Furthermore, we examine the determinants of the market price reaction. Contrary 
to most existing research focusing mainly on the United States, our contribution provides empir-
ical evidence for Germany. Finally, our sample also captures the effects of the financial crisis 
after 2007. 
This paper is organized as follows. First, an overview of related literature is given. In the 
subsequent part, we describe our methodology and the selection of the dataset. The features of 
the selected sample are then outlined in chapter four which provides summary statistics. In sec-
tion five we present and discuss our results on the market response, while the determinants of 
abnormal returns are analyzed in chapter six. Finally we conclude our results. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Research papers mostly conclude that analyst recommendations contain new information 
and do in fact add value. An early stream of research mostly concentrated on the information 
content of recommendations. Most of the findings report a significant market reaction in the 
wake of consensus revisions. In contrast, the more recent analyses rather concentrate on the 
determining factors of the abnormal return. Therefore, the comprehensive literature on analyst 
recommendations can be classified into two main groups that will subsequently be discussed in 
more detail. 
The first group consists of studies that give evidence on the information content of rec-
ommendations. The most likely cited paper “Do Brokerage Analysts` Recommendations Have 
Investment Value?” by Kent L. Womack (1996) [3] examines the price reaction of recommen-
dation changes both at the event time (measured by a three day event window) and in the 
months before and after the event including a sample of recommendations of fourteen major US 
brokerage firms in the period of 1989 to 1991. This sample comprises 1.573 recommendation 
changes made for 822 different companies. Womack documents that during an event window of 
three days a significant price increase of 3.00% for buy recommendations and a significant price 
drop of 4.70% on average for sell recommendations can be observed. The mean post event re-
turn for buy recommendations hence is modest and short lived whereas it is larger and longer 
for sell recommendations. The immediate reactions appear to be of permanent nature and imply 
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that recommendations indeed include valuable information. Therefore, the significant price 
reactions can be seen as an evidence for market efficiency. Further studies on the information 
content of recommendations are provided among others by Dimson / Marsh (1984) [5], Elton / 
Gruber / Grossman (1986) [6], Francis / Soffer (1997) [7], Brav / Lehavy (2003) [8] as well as 
Michaely / Womack (2003) [9]. 
The second group of research examines the determining factors of the examined price 
reaction. The study “The Anatomy of the Performance of Buy and Sell Recommendations” by 
Scott E. Stickel (1995) [10] investigates the market reaction and their determining factors for a 
sample of 80 US brokerage firms in the period of 1988 to 1991. In total he analyses 16,957 rec-
ommendation changes (8,790 buy and 8,167 sell recommendations) of 1,179 companies. Con-
cerning the information content of the recommendations he observed a mean price increase of 
1.16% for an event window of ten days and 3.57% for a longer event window of 125 days as 
well as a mean price decrease of 1.28% for the short event window and 2.11% for the longer 
event window. Hence, his findings are in general consistent with those of Womack (1996) [3]. 
Beyond the market response to recommendations he also tested for the determinants of the price 
reaction using cross sectional regressions of the abnormal returns. His analysis shows that the 
strength of recommendation as well as the firm size and the revision of earnings forecasts ap-
pear to be permanent. Further studies on the second group of research are provided among oth-
ers by Krische / Lee (2000) [1], Bradshaw (2002) [11], Brav / Lehavy (2003) [8], Kerl / Walter 
(2007) [12] and Stickel (2007) [4]. 
Our paper covers both of the two above mentioned research questions. Moreover combin-
ing the two research questions in one paper and working on the German stock market is a fairly 
new approach. 
 
 
3. Hypotheses and Methodology 
 
In efficient markets stock prices have to be related to new information. Therefore event 
studies that capture price changes due to recommendation changes should offer evidence for the 
semistrong form of market efficiency. If a positive (upgrade) or negative (downgrade) change in 
analyst recommendations contain new information the price of the respective stock should im-
mediately adjust according to the change. Therefore, the stock price should increase following a 
recommendation upgrade and decrease following a recommendation downgrade which leads to 
our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis H1:  A recommendation upgrade (downgrade) leads to an immediate increase 
(decrease) of the stock price. 
 
We test this hypothesis by means of an event study, in which a change in the consensus of 
the recommendation level indicates an event. As reported, previous research normally finds that 
upgrades (downgrades) have positive (negative) effects on stock prices. Moreover the findings 
should be ancillary evidence for the semistrong type of market efficiency and therefore confirm 
hypothesis H1. 
In order to get a further idea of the anatomy of the stock price reaction six parameters are 
tested using ordinary least square regressions for the hypothesized factors. Apart from company 
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specific factors like company size (measured by the market capitalization) and the book-to-
market ratio of equity also recommendation specific factors are tested. These factors represent 
the level of consensus recommendation and the dimension of consensus recommendation revi-
sions as Stickel (2004) [4] proposed. In addition, the level of the mean target price as well as the 
dimension of the mean target price revision is analyzed as a potential factor. 
A second hypothesis relates to company size. In general, less information is available 
for smaller companies and it is also released less frequently. Thus, the impact of an infor-
mation release is hypothesized to be more intense for a small company than for bigger com-
panies [13]. Analyst recommendations can therefore be seen as the occurrence of new in-
formation: 
 
Hypothesis H2: Small companies display a stronger reaction to revisions in consensus rec-
ommendations (expressed by upgrades as well as downgrades). 
 
The size of a company is measured by the market capitalization on the day of the event. 
The observations in our sample need to be ranked by quartiles and divided into two groups 
(small and big) represented by the two dummy variables SIZE_LOW for small companies and 
SIZE_HIGH for big companies. We expect the coefficient of the variable SIZE_LOW to be 
positive for upgrades and negative for downgrades. The coefficient of the variable SIZE_HIGH 
is expected to be negative for upgrades and positive for downgrades. 
According to Fama and French (1992) [14], average returns are positively related to the 
book-to-market ratio (B/M). It is argued that value stocks bear higher risk because a high B/M 
signals distress. Hence, negative information on a company classified as a value stock could 
worsen its situation. Such bad information could be represented by a recommendation down-
grade. Furthermore, as Fama and French (1998) [15] argue, also good information provided by a 
recommendation upgrade cannot improve the situation of a company in distress. Therefore we 
hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis H3: Companies classified as value stocks display a stronger reaction to down-
grades than companies classified as growth stocks. Conversely, growth 
stocks display stronger reaction to upgrades than value stocks. 
 
The B/M ratio of a company is measured by the book value of equity divided by the mar-
ket capitalization on the day of the event. Like in the test for the previous hypothesis the sample 
is ranked by quartiles and divided into two groups represented by the dummy variables 
BM_LOW for companies with a low B/M ratio (growth stocks) and BM_HIGH for companies 
with a high B/M ratio (value stocks), respectively. The coefficient of the variable BM_LOW is 
expected to be positive for upgrades as well as for downgrades. The coefficient of the variable 
BM_HIGH is expected to be negative for upgrades as well as for downgrades. 
The next two factors focus on the recommendation of the analyst itself. The first factor 
we look at is the strength of recommendation. By issuing e.g. a buy recommendation, the ana-
lyst signals that in his eyes the respective stock is undervalued by the market. Thus a strong buy 
must be an even stronger signal. As a consequence the information included in this recommen-
dation is richer in content and should lead to a stronger price reaction of the valued stock. This 
proposition should likewise also be true for a sell and a strong sell recommendation which pro-
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vide the opinion that a stock is overvalued. Therefore, a downgrade to a strong sell should lead 
to a sharper price reaction relative to a downgrade to a pure sell recommendation. 
 
Hypothesis H4: Upgrades to strong buy have a greater positive price effect than upgrades to 
buy or an inferior recommendation. Downgrades to strong sell have a larger 
negative price effect than downgrades to sell or a superior recommendation. 
 
In order to test hypothesis H4 two dummy variables need to be implemented. The varia-
ble STRONGBUY is set equal to one if the upgrade is to a strong buy and otherwise equal to 
zero. Moreover, the variable STRONGSELL is set equal to one in case of a downgrade to 
strong sell and otherwise equal to zero. The coefficients of the variable STRONGBUY as well 
as the coefficient of the variable STRONGSELL are expected to be positive for upgrades and 
negative for downgrades. 
Furthermore, Stickel (1995) [10] argues that revisions in recommendations that skip a 
rank have a greater impact on stock prices. The change of recommendation consensus (del-
ta) is therefore calculated by subtracting the previous recommendation consensus from the 
actual recommendation consensus at a specific date. The delta measures the intensity of a 
change in the recommendation consensus. A positive delta signals an upgrade of the rec-
ommendation consensus whereas a negative delta signals a downgrade of the recommenda-
tion consensus. The greater the magnitude of delta the greater the impact on the stock price 
is expected to be. 
 
Hypothesis H5: Positive (negative) recommendation revisions with a higher delta have a 
greater positive (negative) impact on stock prices than recommendation revi-
sions with a smaller delta.  
 
To test this hypothesis the whole sample needs to be ranked by quartiles and divided into 
two groups (low and high) represented by the two dummy variables DELTA_LOW for small 
changes in recommendation consensus and DELTA_HIGH for larger changes in recommenda-
tion consensus. The coefficient of the variable DELTA_LOW is expected to be negative for 
upgrades as well as for downgrades. The coefficient of the variable DELTA_HIGH is expected 
to be positive for upgrades as well as for downgrades. 
In addition to their recommendations analysts often set target prices. These should re-
flect the fair value of a company and can be seen as an unambiguous statement on the ex-
pected value of a company in the analyst’s eyes, as Brav and Lehavy (2003) [8] argue. Hence, 
the target price has a similar function as the level of the recommendation issued by the ana-
lyst. A target price above the stock price shows that in the analyst’s view the stock is underva-
lued. The higher (lower) the target price compared to the current price, the greater the valua-
tion difference. 
 
Hypothesis H6: Upgrades with a high target price compared to the current stock price have a 
greater positive price impact than low target prices. Downgrades with a low 
target price compared to the current stock price have a greater negative price 
effect than higher target prices. 
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In order to test hypothesis H6 the sample has to be ranked by quartiles and divided into 
two groups (low and high) represented by the dummy variables TARGET_LOW (which stands 
for a low proportion of the target price compared to the current price) and TARGET_HIGH for 
high proportions, respectively. According to the hypothesis the coefficient of the variable 
TARGET_LOW should be negative for upgrades and positive for downgrades. The coefficient 
of the variable TARGET_HIGH is assumed to be positive for upgrades and negative for down-
grades. 
Similar to the delta of the recommendation consensus the revision of the target price 
(delta target price) is calculated by subtracting the previous proportion of target price and 
current stock price from the actual proportion of target price and current stock price. The delta 
of the target price measures the strength of a change in target price. A stronger revision in 
target price should result in a greater price reaction than smaller revisions because of larger 
prospect changes. This can be applied for positive changes as well as for negative changes in 
delta. 
 
Hypothesis H7: Positive (negative) target price revisions with a higher delta have a greater 
positive (negative) impact on stock prices than target price revisions with a 
smaller delta. 
 
To test this hypothesis the observations in our sample have to be ranked by quartiles 
and divided into two groups (low and high) represented by the two dummy variables 
DELTATARGET_LOW for small changes in target price and DELTATARGET_HIGH for 
large changes in target price. The coefficient of the variable DELTATARGET_LOW is 
assumed to be negative for upgrades as well as for down-grades. The coefficient of the vari-
able DELTATARGET_HIGH is expected to be positive for up-grades as well as for down-
grades. 
The primary data examined in this paper are taken from Reuters Knowledge for the pe-
riod of 1999 to the end of 2008. Like this, the sample captures various economic cycle situa-
tions such as the internet bubble around 2000/2001 and the subsequent boom as well as the 
impacts of the worldwide economic crises in the wake of the subprime crisis in 2007. The 
sample comprises of recommendations about German companies that are constituents of the 
DAX, MDAX or SDAX. Consequently the selected market guarantees a representative sam-
ple size. 
To measure the impact of changes in recommendation consensus an event study accord-
ing to Wells (2004) [16] is implemented. A change in the recommendation consensus of a cer-
tain company in the examined sample identifies an event (t). Four different event windows 
reaching from day t-1 to t+3 (5 days), t-1 to t+8 (10 days), t-1 to t+18 (20 days) and t-1 to t+28 (30 
days) are used to assess the temporary as well as the permanent effects. These different event 
windows should also capture longer lasting effects [3]. The inclusion of the day before the event 
(t-1) captures the price reactions prior to the event. Such a significant price reaction, taking place 
before the event, might be due to traders with superior information. In addition to the event and 
the event window the normal stock return has to be defined. Following MacKinley (1997) [17] 
and Henderson (1990) [18] we concentrate on the market-adjusted model and the mean-adjusted 
model. For the use of this article the normal return for the mean-adjusted model is calculated 
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within an estimation period of 180 trading days prior to the event window. The sample compris-
es companies either included in the DAX, MDAX or SDAX. Each of the three indices can be 
seen as a market. Therefore, the affiliation of a company to an index determines the market. 
Consequently the normal return for the market-adjusted model is calculated using the respective 
index of a company included in the sample. All abnormal returns are aggregated across all com-
panies and throughout time. Moreover, the various abnormal returns have to be tested statistical-
ly. The result of these tests ascertains whether the abnormal returns as well as the aggregated 
abnormal returns are significantly different from zero. This step is carried out by using a para-
metric t-test as well as the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (Rank test). Due to the fact 
that prior literature [18, 19, 20] states that the parametric t-test is the best choice to test the sig-
nificance, the results of t-test will have a higher weight. The results of the Wilcoxon signed rank 
test will serve as additional evidence. In order to analyze the determinants of the abnormal re-
turn the anatomy of these returns is analyzed by means of ordinary least square (OLS) regres-
sions including six different factors. In a first step, each factor is regressed separately followed 
by a multifactor regression including all factors. 
 
 
4. Sample Statistics 
 
As mentioned above, the primary data is taken from Reuters Knowledge for the period 
from 1998 to 2008. In order to calculate the abnormal return for the mean adjusted method stock 
price data of 180 trading days prior to the first event is needed. Therefore, the examination pe-
riod starts in 1998 and is reduced by one year resulting in a final data period of ten years starting 
on January 1, 1999 and ending on December 31, 2008. 
Using the consensus of recommendations instead of only single analyst recommendations 
reflects the views of all analysts covering a specific stock. As this figure is reported in a variety 
of financial websites as well as several financial databases, investors have easy access to this 
information. The recommendations can be generally expressed with “buy”, “hold” and “sell”. 
Furthermore, the phrase “strong” is used to intensify the buy or sell recommendation. These 
expressions are converted by the brokerage houses into a five point scale. For the use of this 
analysis the recommendation phrases refer to certain numbers on the five point recommendation 
scale. A “strong buy” refers to a recommendation consensus higher than 1.5, a “buy” has to be 
equal or below 1.5 but above 2.5, a “hold” has to be equal or lower than 2.5 but better than 3.5, 
a “sell” has to be equal or worse than 3.5 but better than 4.5 and a “strong sell” has to be lower 
than 4.5 on the five point scale. Especially the classification of the “strong” recommendations is 
important because they are used as determining factors for hypothesis H4. Some studies expand 
their definition of strong sell to sell because these recommendations are rather seldom issued. 
Due to the size of the gathered sample this step is not necessary. 
As some papers had problems with the size of their sample we chose the German mar-
ket for our analysis because it is one of the largest and most liquid markets in Europe. The 
companies are selected regarding to their affiliation to the three German main indices DAX, 
MDAX, and SDAX on the date of December 31, 2008 which leads to a sample of 129 compa-
nies. On the company level the main selection criterion is the availability of a recommenda-
tion consensus. After controlling for this criterion, the number of companies is reduced to 127 
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due to missing consensus recommendations for two companies creating 20703 events. Further 
selection criteria are the availability of a mean target price as well as the share price and the 
market capitalization. After controlling for these three criteria the number of companies is 
once again reduced to 126. The reduced number of companies as well as the adjustments of 
the selection criteria produces a total of 14,471 events. The following table provides an over-
view of the number of events derived from the examined sample. Nevertheless, the sample 
leads to a representative group for the examination due to the selected time horizon as well as 
the selected market. 
 
 
5. Market Response 
 
In order to analyze the market reaction to revisions in recommendation consensus the 
data set is split into positive (upgrades) and negative (downgrades) consensus recommenda-
tion revisions. Table 1 shows the results for upgrades. It can be observed that there is an ab-
normal return on the day prior to the event day. With respect to all four statistical tests the 
picture is rather unclear. One could conclude that the market does not react significantly to 
upgrades on the day prior to the event day. Additionally, it can be observed that the effects are 
at least a higher significant from the event day t until event day t+2. The days following event 
day t+2 offer mixed results. The abnormal returns of the remaining event days change their 
sign rather frequently. Regarding the mean cumulated abnormal return it can be observed that 
three out of four event windows show highly significant results for both models as well as for 
both statistical tests. Similar results can be observed for downgrades. Table 2 depicts the re-
sults for downgrades in recommendation consensus. Contrary to the upgrades the event day 
prior to the event day t shows a highly significant market reaction for both models and both 
statistical test which is an unequivocal sign for insider activity. The abnormal returns for the 
following four event days are highly significantly different from zero. Event day t+4 shows 
highly significant values except the t-test for the mean-adjusted model. Also the effects on the 
following day (event day t+5) are significantly different from zero with at least a high signifi-
cant abnormal return for each model and test. Equal to upgrades the event days thereafter 
show a mixed picture with both significant and non significant statistics. The same behavior 
of abnormal returns can be observed which is that abnormal returns start with a rather low 
magnitude compared to the event day, reach the peak on the event day t and get subsequently 
lower again. All mean cumulative abnormal returns representing the four event windows 
show highly significant abnormal returns. 
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Table 1 
 
Significance test of AR for upgrades 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from Reuters Knowledge following Stickel (1995) [10] 
Mean t-test Rank-test Mean t-test Rank-test
t-01 0.06% 1.71 * 1.05 0.05% 1.42 0.67 
t 0.40% 11.29 *** 11.90 *** 0.43% 11.09 *** 11.47 ***
t +01 0.16% 4.09 *** 2.30 ** 0.18% 5.13 *** 6.66 ***
t +02 0.12% 3.54 *** 2.69 *** 0.10% 3.07 *** 3.02 ***
t +03 0.02% 0.42 0.75 0.05% 1.23 2.18 **
t +04 -0.14% -4.15 *** 3.50 *** -0.07% -2.18 ** 1.76 *
t +05 -0.03% -0.83 1.70 * 0.00% 0.14 0.66 
t +06 0.11% 3.10 *** 1.07 0.08% 2.56 ** 0.96 
t +07 -0.02% -0.48 1.21 0.03% 1.04 0.53 
t +08 -0.13% -3.92 *** 3.81 *** -0.09% -2.75 *** 2.46 **
t +09 0.03% 1.00 1.76 * 0.04% 1.24 0.49 
t +10 0.05% 1.40 1.92 * 0.03% 0.86 1.74 *
t +11 -0.11% -3.09 *** 4.16 *** -0.03% -0.93 1.29 
t +12 -0.11% -3.16 *** 3.81 *** -0.05% -1.56 1.54 
t +13 0.12% 3.46 *** 1.08 0.11% 3.50 *** 2.29 **
t +14 0.06% 1.88 * 1.09 0.05% 1.48 1.75 *
t +15 -0.07% -2.23 ** 2.21 ** -0.06% -2.09 ** 1.32 
t +16 -0.07% -2.08 ** 2.62 *** -0.06% -1.82 * 1.38 
t +17 -0.07% -2.10 ** 2.75 *** -0.06% -1.71 * 1.60 
t +18 0.00% 0.08 0.14 0.00% 0.08 0.58 
t +19 -0.01% -0.28 1.85 * -0.02% -0.66 1.37 
t +20 0.01% 0.18 1.07 -0.04% -1.20 2.24 **
t +21 -0.07% -2.20 ** 2.95 *** -0.05% -1.58 1.03 
t +22 -0.09% -2.65 *** 2.42 ** -0.04% -1.47 1.13 
t +23 0.00% 0.07 0.00 0.02% 0.80 0.27 
t +24 0.02% 0.73 0.40 0.08% 2.65 *** 2.44 **
t +25 -0.07% -2.11 ** 3.45 *** -0.01% -0.27 1.39 
t +26 0.03% 0.78 0.60 0.06% 1.92 * 1.90 *
t +27 0.07% 1.89 * 0.05 0.07% 1.99 ** 0.74 
t +28 0.02% 0.53 0.60 0.05% 1.44 0.36 
CAR(t -01,t +03 ) 0.75% 10.63 *** 11.02 *** 0.80% 10.31 *** 13.05 ***
CAR(t -01,t +08 ) 0.54% 6.01 *** 7.51 *** 0.77% 7.56 *** 10.11 ***
CAR(t -01,t +18 ) 0.37% 3.23 *** 4.38 *** 0.73% 5.17 *** 7.34 ***
CAR(t -01,t +28 ) 0.27% 1.97 ** 3.43 *** 0.85% 4.92 *** 6.93 ***
***, **, * indicate statistical significane at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
Market-adjusted model Mean-adjusted model
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Table 2 
 
Significance test of AR for downgrades 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from Reuters Knowledge following Stickel (1995) [10] 
Mean t-test Rank-test Mean t-test Rank-test
t-01 -0.26% -6.04 *** 6.06 *** -0.23% -5.09 *** 4.47 ***
t -0.57% -13.01 *** 15.82 *** -0.59% -12.44 *** 14.20 ***
t +01 -0.22% -5.66 *** 9.46 *** -0.24% -6.80 *** 7.64 ***
t +02 -0.10% -2.70 *** 4.15 *** -0.10% -2.85 *** 3.98 ***
t +03 -0.17% -4.22 *** 5.77 *** -0.13% -3.52 *** 4.81 ***
t +04 -0.13% -3.20 *** 5.24 *** -0.06% -1.64 3.61 ***
t +05 -0.09% -2.30 *** 2.99 *** -0.07% -2.03 *** 2.32 **
t +06 0.00% -0.04 2.23 ** 0.00% 0.08 2.37 **
t +07 -0.09% -2.24 *** 3.41 *** -0.03% -0.93 1.83 *
t +08 -0.17% -4.83 *** 5.31 *** -0.09% -2.77 *** 2.66 ***
t +09 -0.06% -1.69 *** 3.19 *** -0.01% -0.28 1.54 
t +10 0.04% 0.92 1.52 0.05% 1.40 0.61 
t +11 -0.06% -1.80 *** 2.91 *** -0.01% -0.37 1.71 *
t +12 -0.04% -1.09 2.91 *** 0.03% 0.84 0.13 
t +13 0.02% 0.55 1.73 * 0.01% 0.41 0.92 
t +14 0.02% 0.50 0.22 -0.01% -0.42 0.82 
t +15 -0.10% -2.68 *** 4.53 *** -0.09% -2.56 *** 4.46 ***
t +16 -0.09% -2.65 *** 3.30 *** -0.10% -3.07 *** 3.62 ***
t +17 -0.03% -0.83 1.30 -0.01% -0.19 0.21 
t +18 -0.06% -1.57 2.24 ** -0.03% -0.92 0.58 
t +19 -0.11% -3.13 *** 4.91 *** -0.08% -2.55 *** 3.42 ***
t +20 0.00% 0.00 0.87 -0.03% -0.90 1.04 
t +21 0.00% -0.06 2.19 ** 0.02% 0.59 0.93 
t +22 -0.12% -3.38 *** 3.64 *** -0.08% -2.55 *** 2.17 **
t +23 -0.07% -1.88 *** 2.30 ** -0.02% -0.49 0.68 
t +24 -0.06% -1.65 *** 3.38 *** -0.02% -0.46 1.87 *
t +25 -0.02% -0.43 2.28 ** 0.04% 1.16 0.04 
t +26 -0.03% -0.89 1.44 0.01% 0.27 0.50 
t +27 0.02% 0.44 0.71 -0.01% -0.16 1.44 
t +28 0.00% -0.07 1.91 * 0.02% 0.61 0.53 
CAR(t -01,t +03 ) -1.32% -15.71 *** 17.33 *** -1.30% -14.35 *** 14.61 ***
CAR(t -01,t +08 ) -1.80% -17.40 *** 18.57 *** -1.55% -13.47 *** 13.36 ***
CAR(t -01,t +18 ) -2.17% -16.51 *** 16.65 *** -1.72% -11.02 *** 10.19 ***
CAR(t -01,t +28 ) -2.57% -16.58 *** 16.70 *** -1.86% -9.96 *** 8.93 ***
***, **, * indicate statistical significane at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
Market-adjusted model Mean-adjusted model
 40 Johannes Ruhm, Marco J. Menichetti, Pascal Gantenbein 
Overall, the findings show that stock prices react with a relatively high significance prior 
to the event day t. We can therefore conclude that some market participants may receive the 
new information earlier than others and therefore have a time advantage which they can exploit. 
Another factor leading to this result may be the nature of consensus calculation used in this 
study. Because the consensus includes several recommendations which are released during the 
entire day it is likely that the consensus is published towards the end of the day. Obviously indi-
vidual analyst recommendations are published during the entire day. Market participants follow-
ing individual analyst recommendations which are also included in the consensus but probably 
published earlier than the consensus may cause the abnormal return prior the event day. Both 
upgrades and downgrades show a significant reaction on the event day t, t+1 and t+2. Therefore, 
hypothesis H1 can be confirmed. The results clearly show that upgrades lead to an increase and 
downgrades to a decrease in stock prices. Beyond that it is necessary to mention that according 
to the existing literature the effect of downgrades lasts longer than the effect of upgrades. 
In order to get a more detailed picture of the market reaction figure 1 and 2 illustrate the 
accumulation of mean abnormal returns for the individual event days graphically. Figure 1 
shows that the most intense market reaction takes place during the first days of the event win-
dow respectively from event day t-1 till event day t+2. This reaction results in a cumulated mean 
abnormal return of 0.76% on event day t+2. This is nearly the same for both the market-adjusted 
and the mean-adjusted model. Although there is a peak with 0.91% on event day t+14 within the 
mean-adjusted model the cumulated mean abnormal return more or less levels out after the in-
tense rise. Moreover it can be observed that there is a difference between the two models begin-
ning around event day t+3. Nevertheless the direction of both models is nearly the same for the 
following event days. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Cumulated mean abnormal return for upgrades 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from Reuters Knowledge following Green (2006) 
[21], p. 9. 
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Obviously figure 2 shows that downgrades in recommendation consensus create a nega-
tive stock price reaction with a strong and sharp decline during the first days of the event win-
dow. Until event day t+3 both models nearly proceed parallel. After this event day, the levels of 
the two models change whereas the market-adjusted model proceeds on a lower level than the 
mean-adjusted model, but the rather rectified deployment remains. These observations support 
the result of the significance test displayed in table 1 and 2. The intense reaction in the early 
event window indicates new information resulting in a positive market reaction for upgrades 
and a negative market reaction for downgrades even on the day prior to the event. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the market reaction to downgrades is higher than the reaction to upgrades. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Cumulated mean abnormal return for downgrades 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from Reuters Knowledge following Green (2006) 
[21], p. 9. 
 
The following two tables summarize and outline the main findings to answer the question 
which determinants drive the abnormal returns. The signs for the dummy variables can either 
take the position of a plus (significant coefficient in line with the predicted sign) or a minus 
(coefficient is either not significant or not in line with the predicted sign). Changing signs with-
in a column are separated using a slash. 
Table 3 shows that except for the four event windows in the multi factor model within the 
mean-adjusted model, the result of the dummy variable STRONG_BUY has significant coeffi-
cients with the expected sign. Furthermore, the dummy variables DELTA_LOW and 
DELTA_HIGH are the first determinants which show significant coefficients in both the mar-
ket-adjusted and the mean-adjusted model as well as in the distinction between the single and 
multi factor regressions. It can be observed that the market-adjusted model displays significant 
values in every case. On the other hand, the mean-adjusted model shows significant coefficients 
within the single factor model for the first three event windows as well as for the first two event 
windows within the multi factor model. Therefore, it can be concluded that hypothesis H5 is 
valid for the first two event windows (CAR(t-1,t+3) and (CAR(t-1,t+8) but not for the other ones. 
-2,80%
-2,50%
-2,20%
-1,90%
-1,60%
-1,30%
-1,00%
-0,70%
-0,40%
-0,10%
t-1 t+1 t+3 t+5 t+7 t+9 t+11 t+13 t+15 t+17 t+19 t+21 t+23 t+25 t+27
Event Window
   
   
   
   
 C
um
ul
at
ed
 m
ea
n 
A
R
   
   
Market-adjusted model Mean-adjusted model
 42 Johannes Ruhm, Marco J. Menichetti, Pascal Gantenbein 
Table 3 
 
Final summary of OLS regressions for upgrades 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
Overall, it can be summarized that upgrades to strong buy have a greater positive price ef-
fect than upgrades to buy or an inferior recommendation. Furthermore, positive recommenda-
tion revisions (upgrades) with a higher delta have a greater positive impact on stock prices than 
recommendation revisions with a smaller delta. 
Table 4 summarizes the results for downgrades. Compared to all other dummy variables, 
DELTATARGET_LOW and DELTATARGET_HIGH display a distinct finding. Each event 
window for both normal return models as well as both regression models shows significant co-
efficients which are in line with the predicted sign. 
 
Table 4 
 
Final summary of OLS regressions for downgrades 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations 
Upgrades
Single factor model Multi factor model Single factor model Multi factor model
SIZE_LOW +/--- ---- ++++ --/++
SIZE_HIGH ---- ---- ++++ -/+++
BM_LOW ++++ +/-/++ ---- ----
BM_HIGH ++++ ++++ ---- ----
STRONG_BUY ++++ ++++ ++++ ----
DELTA_LOW ++++ ++++ +++/- ++/--
DELTA_HIGH ++++ ++++ +++/- ++/--
TARGET_LOW ---- ---- --/++ --/++
TARGET_HIGH ---- ---- -/+++ -/+++
DELTATARGET_LOW ---- ---- ---- ----
DELTATARGET_HIGH ---- ---- ---- ----
Market adjusted method Mean adjusted method
Downgrades
Single factor model Multi factor model Single factor model Multi factor model
SIZE_LOW ++++ ++++ ++++ +++/-
SIZE_HIGH ++++ --/++ +++/- ----
BM_LOW ++++ ++++ ---- ----
BM_HIGH ++++ ++++ +/--- ----
STRONG_SELL -/+/-- ---- ---- ----
DELTA_LOW ---- ---- ---- ----
DELTA_HIGH ---- ---- ---- ----
TARGET_LOW ++++ --/++ +/--- ----
TARGET_HIGH ++++ ++++ ++/-- ++/--
DELTATARGET_LOW ++++ ++++ ++++ ++++
DELTATARGET_HIGH ++++ ++++ ++++ ++++
Market adjusted method Mean adjusted method
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To summarise, it can be stated that only hypothesis H7 can be confirmed for downgrades. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that negative target price revisions with a higher delta have a 
greater negative impact on stock prices than target price revisions with a smaller delta. 
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
 
Our event study documents an immediate and highly significant reaction for both 
upgrades and downgrades in recommendation consensus. Additionally, it can be observed that 
the reaction for downgrades lasts longer (until event day t+5) than for upgrades (event day t+2). 
Consequently, it can be concluded that the revisions in consensus recommendation do contain 
new information which is consistent with semistrong market efficiency. 
The magnitude of the reported market reaction is consistent with previous studies, 
documenting a significantly asymmetric reaction of a mean cumulated abnormal return of 
0.74% (market-adjusted method) or 0.76% (mean adjusted-method) for upgrades within an 
event window of four days (t-1 until t+2) and -1.54% (market-adjusted method) or -1.43% (mean-
adjusted method) for downgrades within an event window of seven days (t-1 until t+5). 
Furthermore, the results also indicate that there is a post recommendation drift. However, due to 
the fact that the significance test does not show a clear picture the post recommendation drift 
cannot be approved. In addition, it can be argued that the post recommendation drift is triggered 
by other events taking place in the meantime or in other words that the observed abnormal 
return has different reasons than the revision in recommendation consensus. Besides the 
examination of the market reaction the results display that factors like the level of the 
recommendation, the magnitude of the revision in recommendation as well as the magnitude of 
the target price revision are determining factors of the observed abnormal return. The findings 
show that up-grades to strong buy result in a higher stock price reaction than upgrades to 
another consensus recommendation level. Furthermore, high consensus recommendation 
revisions have a higher stock price impact than lower revisions. On the other hand, downgrades 
with a higher delta of the target price revision have a larger negative impact on stock prices than 
target price revisions with a smaller delta. These findings are partly consistent with the findings 
of Stickel (1995) [10]. It can be concluded that the German stock market is to some extent 
inefficient. 
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